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Résumé/Abstract
Ce papier étudie le lien entre les audits environnementaux et la
rémunération des employés. Dans un modèle dagence à une période,
lagent doit partager son attention entre les aspects environnementaux et
ceux strictement financiers de sa tâche. La performance de lagent sur le
plan financier est constamment surveillée; sur le plan environnemental,
par contre, lemployeur neffectue que des contrôles ponctuels au moyen
daudits environnementaux. On trouve que le salaire optimal a une
moyenne inférieure et une variance supérieure quand lemployeur a
recours à un audit environnemental. La menace dun audit
environnemental augmente donc le risque pesant sur lagent, ce qui
entraîne que le salaire attendu intialement par lagent sera plus élevé et son
attention aux aspects environnementaux plus forte que si cette menace
nexistait pas.
This paper studies the link between environmental audits and employee
compensation. The context is a one-period principal-agent relationship
where the agent must allocate effort between financial and environmental
tasks. The former are routinely monitored while the latter are audited (at
some cost) only under specific circumstances. We find that the optimal
wages have a lower mean and greater variance when there is an
environmental audit than when there is not. This puts more risk on the
agent, so the expected wage ex ante is higher and the agents effort on
the environmental task greater than in a situation with no environmental
audits.
In the United States, for example, companies are required to report to the Securities and Exchange2
Commission about prospective environmental liabilities, and to report emissions of any of the 300
substances on the Toxic Release Inventory.
Monsanto has set a five-year plan to cut air emissions of toxic chemicals by 90% and presents its progress3
in a publicly released environmental report. Another major chemical firm, Union Carbide, audits its
compliance with the industrys Responsible Care programme which sets targets and means for
environmental risk reduction.
Danish Steel Works, for example, measures various environmental resource inputs and outputs of both4
pollutants and products. The German textile manufacturer, Kunert, similarly calculates and publishes its
eco-balance sheet.
B&Q, one of Britains biggest do-it-yourself retailer, requires such information from all its vendors.5
This is reportedly one of the reasons for business interest in the British Standards Institutes BS7750 on6
environmental management. Regular internal environmental audits appear as a criterion for meeting the
standard, and widespread adoption of BS7750 might forestall European Commission regulatory initiatives.
[The Economist, May 16, 1992].
The EU published a draft proposal for a system of environmental audits in December 1990 [see reference
3]. The proposal entailed mandatory audits, validation by registered environmental auditors, and public
disclosure of audits results. Subsequent drafts have dropped the mandatory features. No directive has been
passed to date.
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1. Introduction
Environmental audits are the most commonly used tool of green
management [see 5, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Yet the uses managers make of the results of
environmental audits, and thus the motives for conducting them, have to the best of our
knowledge, never been formally examined. Are audits principally of value for external
reporting in response to government pressure? For risk analysis and reduction? For2 3
identifying wasteful production practices? In response to demands of local4
communities, customers, banks, and insurers? To forestall unwanted regulatory5
mandates? As an input to incentive compensation systems? And how do answers to6
these questions influence the amount and type of auditing that firms do?
This paper begins to attack some of these broad questions by examining the
link between environmental audits and employee compensation. The necessity of
linking managerial rewards with audit results is obvious. Yet ironically, surveys of
actual practice [5, 13, 16] suggest that even sophisticated companies lack a clear sense
of how the link should be made. Rarely is it made explicit; more commonly it is de
3facto. This is an instance where theoretical academic research can contribute to
business firms needs.
There actually exists a wide literature on corporate audits. This literature
distinguishes two kinds of audits: those aiming to verify a declared outcome, for
example an announced return [10, 12], and those that provide information on a key
input, for example the agents effort [1, 4]. We will focus on the latter kind. Our model
is similar to the principal-agent one used by Baiman and Demsky [1]. The main issue
here, however, is not really the overall amount of effort that the agent delivers but
rather the allocation of this effort between environmental and non-environmental
tasks. Hence, building on our earlier work [6], we use a multi-task principal-agent
model. Multi-task principal-agent models have been proposed only recently to analyse
several contractual issues such as job design [2, 8], asset ownership [8], and
compensation [6, 8]. In those models, the agent must allocate effort between, say, a
financial task and an environmental task. This allocation cannot be observed by the
principal. The principal can only infer the agents effort from some imperfect measure
of performance on each task. Our previous work entailed costless and constant
monitoring of the variable of interest-the agents effort on each task. In reality, every
monitoring system is costly, so the principal may decide against constant monitoring.
In this paper we assume that financial performance is always monitored, but we
endogenize the principals decision to audit environmental performance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to presenting
the multi-task principal-agent model. The method by which we solve this model  the
first-order approach  is sketched in section 3. Section 4 contains our main results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model
Consider a one-period principal-agent relationship in which the agent must
split his effort between traditional profit-generating activities and environmental
Assuming that the set of signals is finite instead of continuous does not bear any consequences on results.7
It just simplifies the exposition.
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protection. Let the amount of effort spent on profit-generating activities and
environmental protection be denoted by x and y respectively. The agent can vary both
his total effort and the allocation of that effort between the two tasks. The principal
can observe neither the agents total effort not its allocation. The principal, however,
can audit the agent and receive estimates B and , of the revenues generated or costs
reduced by the agents effort, the vector (x,y). Those estimates are drawn from finite
subsets of real numbers according to the likelihood function g(B,,*x,y). We shall7
make the following assumptions concerning g.
ASSUMPTION 1: g(@*x,y) is strictly positive on its domain, for all x, y. At each vector
(B,,), it is twice continuously differentiable in (x,y).
Effort on traditional profit-generating tasks is easily and routinely monitored
through the firms standard financial reporting system. By contrast, efforts to protect
the environment are difficult to monitor and environmental audits are necessarily
infrequent at best. On the basis of the information available (B) from financial
monitoring, the principal may audit the agent with probability m(B). Although efforts
on the two activities differ in terms of ease of monitoring, let us assume that the
consequences of each can be denominated in expected financial values. This is clear
enough in the case of fines for environmental damage. Let us assume that the
consequences of each can be denominated in expected financial values. This is clear
enough in the case of fines for environmental damage. Let us assume as well that
financial values can be put on less explicit costs or benefits of environmental
performance such as its impact on company reputation to customers, employees,
shareholders, and community residents. If an environmental audit is done, a fixed cost
K is incurred and the estimate , which can be positive or negative is received. The
The principals risk neutrality and the agents indifference between tasks are not crucial assumptions but8
they considerably simplify the analysis.
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principal then corrects her estimate of expected total profit (before wage and audit
costs) to B+,.
We shall suppose that, conditional on (x,y), B and , are independent. That
is, the only relationship between B and , comes through the agents effort allocation.
Thus, we can write the likelihood function g as the product of two one-dimensional
distributions, that is
g(B,,*x,y) = f(B*x) h(,*y) .
The principal is risk neutral. The agents behavior, on the other hand, fits the
following assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 2: The agent has a utility U:ú6ú for money that is strictly+
increasing, continuously differentiable, and exhibits strict risk aversion (i.e., U is
strictly concave). Moreover, U is such that twice the coefficient of risk aversion (-
U/U) is at least as large as the so-called coefficient of prudence (-U/U).
ASSUMPTION 3: An effort vector (x,y) costs the agent C(x+y), where the function
C:ú 6ú is increasing, convex and twice continuously differentiable. C(0) = 0, C(0)+ +
= 0, and C(4) = 4.
Assumption 2 allows for a very broad class of utility functions, for example those
exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion. Assumption 3 implies that the agent is
indifferent ex ante to effort spent on profit-generating activities or environmental
protection. There is no constraint on the agents effort level, but total effort has rising8
marginal cost.
The principal can now offer two kinds of employment contract to the agent.
On is a wage dependent only on measured performance on the traditional profit-
generating activities. In this case, there are no environmental audits, and that fact is
known for certain to both the principal and the agent. The second contract includes the
possibility that the agent may be subject to an unannounced environmental audit, and
6(1)
his wage will be conditional in part on the audit results. How frequently, or whether,
audits are actually done under this contract is then for the principal to decide. In this
context, the principal offers the agent a contract that pays him a wage of either s(B)
when only the estimate B is gathered, or w(B,,) if the agent is audited. This contract
must provide the agent with a utility at least equal to his reservation utility U . It must*
also motivate the agent who always sets his effort level and allocation in order to
maximize his own satisfaction. The contract which binds together the principal and
the agent is then a solution to:
This is a formulation of the well-known principal-agent problem. The principal
selects the wage schedule that maximizes her expected payoff under incentive
compatibility and participation constraints. Another decision variable for the principal
here is m(B), the probability of auditing the agent following the observation of the
profit estimate B.
The description of the model is now complete, so we can turn to its solution,
and the derivation and analysis of the results.
3. Method used to solve the model
This section outlines the method that we use to solve the above principal-
agent model described above.
The first constraint of problem (1)  incentive compatibility 
encompasses a continuum of inequalities. To make the problem tractable, we shall
The subscripts and denote partial derivatives with respect to x and y respectively.9 x y
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(2)
therefore replace the incentive compatibility constraint by the first-order necessary
conditions for having a stationary point of the agents expected utility. This yields the
relaxed problem:
Solving problem (1) by solving this relaxation of it instead is called the first-
order approach. It is certain to work provided a solution to problem (2) exists and
the following assumptions restricting the class of likelihood functions hold (see
Sinclair-Desgagné [11]).
ASSUMPTION 4: [Monotone likelihood ratio property] The ratios
g (B,,*x,y)/g(B,,*x,y) and g (B,,*x,y)/g(B,,*x,y) are nondecreasing in (B,,), for everyx y
vector (x,y).9
ASSUMPTION 5: [Convexity of the distribution function condition] The upper
cumulative probabilities of either B or , are concave in (x,y).
For an interpretation of these assumptions and the history of the first-order
approach, see [11]. Let us now derive the results.
8(3)
(4)
4. Analysis
We shall now derive and analyse the main propositions. Subsection 4.1
below contains the results concerning incentive compensation. Optimal audits are
described in subsection 4.2. The agents resulting effort allocation is studied in
subsection 4.3.
4.1 Optimal compensation
The principals optimal wage schedule must satisfy the first-order necessary
conditions for an optimum of problem (2). Let (, 8, * be the Lagrange multipliers
attached to the first, second and third constraint of (2) respectively. The first two
multipliers, ( and 8, denote the shadow prices of the incentive compatibility
constraints for tasks x and y respectively. They show the increase in the principals
profit of a marginal deviation of the agent from his utility-maximizing effort allocation
on x and y respectively. The third multiplier, *, is the shadow price of the
participation constraint which shows the increase in the principals profit from a
marginal decrease in the agents reservation utility, U . The necessary conditions for*
s are now:
Those conditions for w are:
Given these equations, the following proposition states some general features
of the wage schedule.
PROPOSITION 1: Under the above assumptions, s(B) and w(B,,) have the following
properties:
i) s and w are nondecreasing in their respective arguments.
9(5)
(6)
. . (7)
(8)
ii) If , is small, then s(B) > w(B,,). If , is large, then s(B) < w(B,,).
iii) ' h(,*y)w(B,,) < s(B) .
,
PROOF:
First note that when m(B) = 1 or 0, the wages s(B) or w(B,,) can always be
set so that the above statements be satisfied.
Suppose now that 0 < m(B) < 1. Then, after some straightforward algebra,
equations (3) and (4) can be rewritten respectively as
and
The multipliers *, (, 8 are positive. Hence, by assumptions 2 and 3,
(i) s(B) and w(B,,) are nondecreasing in their arguments.
Substracting (6) and (7), one also gets that
Since' h (,*y) = 0 and h /h is nondecreasing in ,, it must be the case that h (,*y) <
, y y y
0 when , is small and h (,*y) > 0 when , is big. Considering equation (7), this entailsy
that
(ii) s(B) > w(B,,) when , is small, and s(B) < w(B,,) when , is large.
Finally, multiplying equation (6) by h(,*y), summing up with respect to , and
substracting from (5) gives
10
(9)
Since 1/U(@) is a strictly convex function by assumption 3, then
by Jensens inequality. Hence,
(iii) ' h(,*y)w(B,,) < s(B) .
,
Assertions (i), (ii) and (iii) then hold for all (B,,).
Q.E.D.
Part (i) of the proposition says that wages rise with better performance on the
audited tasks. According to (ii), the wage range with an audit spans the wage range
without one. So an agent may be either better or worse paid after an environmental
audit. The wage gradient is steeper and the agent is bearing more risk. The left-hand
term of (iii) is the expected wage if an audit were to take place. Thus, if the
employment contract includes the probability of an audit, the expected wage is lower
if an audit is conducted than if it is not. This has several implications. One is that
even a risk-neutral agent will not want to be audited. The assumption that the agent
is risk-averse only exacerbates his distaste for audits. This is consistent with the
casual observation that environmental audits must overcome resistance from those
audited. Second, an employment contract including the probability of an
environmental audit must pay a higher expected wage than a contract without any such
possibility. Finally, the agent with a contract including audits has an incentive to quit
just prior to being audited if the audit is announced ahead of time and if quitting can
be done costlessly. Hence, the audit must be unexpected and wages must be paid at
the end of each period.
11
(10)
4.2 Optimal audits
The first-order necessary conditions for m(@) in to problem (2) are given by
This yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: When m(B) > 0, 8' U(w(B,,))h $ K .
, y
PROOF:
Using equation (5), the second term of expression (10) can be written as
Substituting the latter term back into expression (10) yields the desired result.
Q.E.D.
The left-hand expression in proposition 2 is the marginal benefit to the
principal of the agents optimal reallocation of effort towards environmental protection
caused by the possibility of an environmental audit. The proposition states that a
necessary condition for the principal to set a positive probability of an environmental
audit is that this term exceeds the cost of the audit. As shown by (10), if that cost
increases, the probability of an audit will decrease. If audits are costly enough, there
will be no audits de facto, and the principal will no longer include the contractual
possibility of an audit. By contrast, if audits become less expensive, or if the agents
behavior is more responsive to the threat of an audit, then the principal would increase
This supports the current position of the International Chamber of Commerce [15], which is sympathetic10
to the principle of audits but hostile to any scheme of mandatory audits.
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their frequency. The proposition makes it clear, however, that the principal would not
necessarily audit with certainty even if audits were free.10
3.3 The allocation of effort
A contract that includes the possibility of environmental audits raises the
principals cost in two ways compared with a contract without any audits. It raises the
expected wage cost and it entails the direct cost of the audits. Offsetting this, however,
is the gain in profits that comes about from the reallocation of the agents effort that
the threat of audits induces. The effort that the agent finally puts into environmental
protection depends on the relative accuracy of the audits.
PROPOSITION 3: LetB and , have the same conditional distribution. Then the agent
devotes as much effort to profit generation as to environmental protection.
PROOF:
The necessary conditions for x are given by
Notice that the necessary conditions for y are exactly the same under the above
assumption. This proves the desired statement.
Q.E.D.
This proposition entails that as long as the results of environmental audits are
about as reliable as those from monitoring profit-seeking activities, the agent would
Of course this statement depends on the probability of an environmental audits being positive at some11
values of B.
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split his effort evenly between environmental and financial tasks. This result may11
seem unsurprising: it is well known in the literature [see, for instance, 7 and 9] that the
(absolute, not relative) accuracy of the monitoring technology is a key parameter for
agency relationships. The last proposition makes it clear, however, that one can tackle
an agency problem in the environmental sphere by using as a benchmark the
technology that is routinely used for monitoring the agents actions on the financial
side.
4. Conclusion
This paper studies the link between environmental audits and managerial
incentive compensation. We have shown that the presence of environmental audits
affects the optimal wage structure and the agents allocation of effort. Wages after an
environmental audit has been performed have a lower mean and higher variance than
those delivered when there is no audit. The agent also allocates more effort to protect
the environment when there is a threat of being subject to environmental audits.
The results presented here certainly do not answer all the questions
surrounding the use of audits. Further research in this area is much needed. Business
firms await some fresh and well-grounded insights concerning the purpose and use of
environmental audits. We hope to have shown that academics have tools that may
help provide such insights.
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